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 1  Introduction 
 The conditions under which international courts (ICs) and tribunals can be considered 
eff ective is an issue of increasing interest to judges, government offi  cials, attorneys, and 
scholars. Th e fresh attention devoted to IC eff ectiveness is the inevitable consequence 
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of a more active international judiciary. 1 As litigants ask courts to adjudicate an 
expanding and diverse array of controversies, judges must inevitably clarify the 
meaning of ambiguous treaty provisions and customary rules, and apply them to 
new and unforeseen contexts. Yet the rising number of IC rulings bears no necessary 
relationship to whether those rulings infl uence state behavior. Nor does it answer 
the more fundamental question of “eff ective for what purpose?”—an inquiry that 
depends on a prior conception of the functions that ICs perform and the goals they 
are expected to achieve. 2 
 Traditionally, the principal function of ICs was to provide a judicial forum to 
assist nation states in settling their disputes. As the number and variety of ICs 
has increased, however, international judges have been given or have assumed a 
broad range of other tasks. Th ese include exercising constitutional, enforcement, 
and administrative review; 3 stabilizing normative expectations and legitimating the 
exercise of public authority; 4 improving state compliance with primary legal norms; 5 
engaging in judicial lawmaking to clarify or expand substantive obligations; 6 and 
enhancing the legitimacy of international norms and institutions, including of ICs 
themselves. 7 
 Recent scholarship on IC eff ectiveness analyzes these functions from a range of 
vantage points. Some studies focus on developing typologies to categorize the mul-
tiple roles that ICs perform. Others assess empirically whether a particular IC, or 
the international judicial system in general, is successful in achieving one or more 
identifi ed objectives. Yet another group of studies makes normative claims about 
which goals international judges ought to prioritize, regardless of the tasks that they 
in fact perform. 
 Th e literature exploring these issues includes works by legal scholars, political 
scientists, and interdisciplinary research teams. It would be impossible in this short 
chapter to do justice to this burgeoning literature. 8 Th e chapter focuses instead on 
 1  For recent statistics, see K Alter,  Th e New Terrain of International Law (Princeton University Press 
2014), ch. 3. 
 2  Y Shany, “Assessing the Eff ectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach” (2012) 106 
AJIL 225; D Shelton, “Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts” (2009) 9 Chi. J. Int’l 
L. 537. 
 3  Alter, note 1, at chs 5–8. 
 4  A von Bogdandy and I Vetzke, “Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers” 
(2011) 12 German L.J. 979, 989–96. 
 5  A Guzman, “International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis” (2008) 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 171, 188; 
Shany, note 2, at 244–5. 
 6  K Alter and LR Helfer, “Nature or Nurture? Judicial Law-Making in the European Court of 
Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice” (2010) 64 Int’l Org. 563, 566; von Bogdandy and Vetzke, 
note 4, at 986–9. 
 7  N Grossman, “Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies” (2009) 41 Geo. Wash. Int’l 
L. Rev. 107, 110; Shany, note 2, at 246–7. 
 8  For references to other scholarship on IC eff ectiveness, see Shany, note 2; G Shaff er and T Ginsburg, 
“Th e Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship” (2012) 106(1) AJIL 16–19. 
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four dimensions of IC eff ectiveness that, in this author’s view, are important either 
because they have engendered debates among scholars, or, conversely, because they 
relate to core IC functions but have received insuffi  cient scrutiny. 
 Th e fi rst dimension,  case-specifi c eff ectiveness (Section 2), evaluates whether the 
litigants to a specifi c dispute follow the orders and provide the remedies that a court 
awards—an issue closely linked to compliance with IC judgments. 9 Th e second 
variant, erga omnes  eff ectiveness (Section 3), assesses whether IC rulings have 
systemic precedential eff ects that infl uence the behavior of all states subject to a tri-
bunal’s jurisdiction. Th e third dimension,  embeddedness eff ectiveness (Section 4), 
evaluates the extent to which ICs anchor their judgments in domestic legal orders, 
enabling national actors to remedy potential treaty violations at home and avoid the 
need for international litigation. Th e fourth type,  eff ectiveness in developing interna-
tional law or  norm-development eff ectiveness (Section 5), considers how IC decisions 
contribute to building a body of international jurisprudence—a topic relevant to the 
decentralized nature of the international legal system and debates over the frag-
mentation of international law. A brief conclusion (Section 6) follows. 
 For each dimension of IC eff ectiveness, the chapter reviews recent studies, identi-
fi es contested or under-analyzed issues and suggests avenues for future research. It 
does not, however, defend the substantive merits of the four eff ectiveness measures, 
nor does it evaluate their consequences for other values or objectives. For example, an 
IC that is adroit at developing international legal norms or embedding its judgments 
in domestic law may, as a result, narrow the discretion of government policymakers 
or diminish state sovereignty. Whether these or other consequences of IC eff ective-
ness are normatively desirable or problematic is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 2  Case-Specific Effectiveness  
 Among the four dimensions of eff ectiveness, scholars have focused most heavily 
on whether the parties to a particular dispute obey an IC’s judgment. Th is section 
reviews the theoretical literature on case-specifi c eff ectiveness and analyzes debates 
among scholars over its relationship to the distinct concept of state compliance with 
IC rulings. Th e section concludes by suggesting how future studies might help to 
resolve these debates and gain greater traction on the causal impact of IC rulings. 
 Early studies of case-specifi c eff ectiveness focused on whether a state found in 
breach of international law changed its behavior following an IC judgment. Laurence 
 9  See, in this handbook, Huneeus, Ch. 20. 
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Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example, defi ned eff ectiveness in terms of an IC’s 
“ability to compel compliance with its judgments by convincing domestic government 
institutions, directly and through pressure from private litigants, to use their power on 
its behalf.” 10 Th is defi nition recognized that most ICs cannot count on international 
enforcement mechanisms and must instead build support from domestic actors 
who in turn induce governments to respect IC rulings. Th e defi nition also expressly 
equated the concepts of case-specifi c eff ectiveness and compliance. 
 Subsequent theoretical contributions, however, emphasized the distinction between 
compliance and eff ectiveness. In an infl uential article, Kal Raustiala defi ned compli-
ance as conformity between behavior and a specifi ed legal rule, and eff ectiveness as 
“observable, desired changes in behavior” attributable to that rule. 11 In applying these 
defi nitions, Raustiala disaggregated the two concepts. High levels of compliance can 
occur “for reasons entirely exogenous to the legal process,” such as where states 
draft  treaties to mirror their preexisting behavior. 12 Conversely, international rules 
“can be eff ective even if compliance with them is low. If a legal standard is quite 
demanding, even widespread failure to meet it may still correlate with observable, 
desired changes in behavior.” 13 
 Th e basic insight is that international rules with high compliance rates may be 
entirely ineff ective, whereas those with low compliance rates may be quite eff ective 
if they engender some modifi cation of state behavior. Th e dangers of confl ating the 
two concepts have led some scholars boldly to assert that compliance is “unusually 
ill-suited to [a] central social-scientifi c pursuit: the identifi cation and measurement 
of causal eff ects,” and to argue in favor of “dropping compliance as a central concept 
in the study of institutional eff ects.” 14 
 Scholars of ICs also stress the need to disentangle compliance and eff ectiveness. 
Karen Alter argues that “the real eff ectiveness test . . . is not compliance but the coun-
terfactual of what the outcome would have been absent the IC. Th ose concerned with 
eff ectiveness should ask whether the IC contributed to moving a state in a more 
law-complying direction.” 15 Shany makes a similar claim regarding judicial reme-
dies: “[A] low-aiming court, issuing minimalist remedies, may generate a high level 
of compliance but have little impact on the state of the world.” 16 Andrew Guzman 
 10  LR Helfer and A-M Slaughter, “Toward a Th eory of Eff ective Supranational Adjudication” (1997) 
107 Yale L.J. 273, 290. 
 11  K Raustiala, “Compliance and Eff ectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation” (2000) 32 
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387, 391, 394. 
 12  Raustiala, note 11, at 393.    13  Raustiala, note 11, at 394. 
 14  L Martin, “Against Compliance” in J Dunoff  and MA Pollack (eds),  Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
on International Law and International Relations:  Th e State of the Art (Cambridge University Press 
2012)  591–2. For further analysis, see E Hafner-Burton, D Victor and Y Lupu, “Political Science 
Research on International Law: Th e State of the Field” (2012) 106 AJIL 47, 89. 
 15  K Alter, “Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context” (2008) 14 Eur. J. Int’l 
Rel. 33, 52. 
 16  Shany, note 2, at 227 (emphasis omitted). 
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emphasizes the converse point, stating that “even when a state fails to comply with a 
tribunal’s ruling, the tribunal may be eff ective at promoting compliance if it imposes 
suffi  cient costs on the state to discourage future violations of the underlying legal 
rule.” 17 
 Th ese studies suggest that the confl ation of compliance and eff ectiveness is as 
problematic when applied to the study of ICs as it is for the analysis of international 
law in general. Yet other scholars have argued, to the contrary, that compliance  is 
an appropriate—and even a superior—measure of IC eff ectiveness in at least one 
important instance: when a court rules that a state has violated international law. As 
Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby explain:
 When a country persists in behaviour long enough for an international court to rule against 
that country’s practices, and the country subsequently changes its practices, we assume that 
the court’s ruling helped trigger the change in behaviour, even if other factors may also 
have been important . . . . Compliance in these circumstances is very unlikely to be the result 
of chance:  most international litigation takes years and costs states signifi cant money to 
defend; it is therefore reasonable to assume that the state prefers to persist in the behaviour 
being challenged in court.  Hence, any resulting behavioural changes aft er an adverse court 
ruling can suggest court eff ectiveness. Th is creates a class of cases where instances of compliance 
will be coextensive with those of eff ectiveness and where eff ectiveness can therefore be objectively 
measured through the proxy of state compliance . 18 
 Alexandra Huneeus expands upon this insight. She recognizes the risks of confl at-
ing compliance and eff ectiveness, but asserts that those risks are “arguably less acute” 
for compliance with court orders than for compliance with treaty commitments 
more generally. If an IC “orders compensation of the victim by a certain amount, and 
the state compensates by that amount, drawing a causal inference is not particularly 
fraught. Th e answer to the counterfactual—would the state have done the same 
without the order—seems self-evident.” 19 
 What accounts for this sharp division in the literature? One possible explanation is 
diff erent scholars are analyzing distinct phenomena. Studies that equate compliance 
and eff ectiveness focus on whether states that litigate and lose a case carry out the 
IC judgments against them, whereas studies that disaggregate the two concepts 
measure an IC’s ability to encourage compliance with underlying legal obligations. 20 
Scholars in the fi rst group implicitly assume that IC rulings impose meaningful 
 17  Guzman, note 5, at 187. 
 18  D Hawkins and W Jacoby, “Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-American 
Courts of Human Rights” (2010) 6 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rel. 35, 40 (emphasis added). Measuring compliance 
is preferable, Hawkins and Jacoby argue, because accurately identifying the subset of “cases of effi  cacy 
from the wider sample of compliance” puts “enormous data demands on researchers,” at 39. 
 19  A Huneeus, “Courts Resisting Courts:  Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to 
Enforce Human Rights” (2011) 44 Cornell Int’l L.J. 493, 505 n.61. 
 20  Guzman, note 5, at 188. See also Shany, note 2, at 227, 244 (labeling these concepts, respectively, as 
“judgment-compliance” and “primary norm compliance”). 
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constraints on state sovereignty and freedom of action—and thus can be eff ective 
even if compliance is slow, partial, or incomplete. 21 Scholars in the second group 
suspect that many IC rulings mirror preexisting state behavior—and thus lead to 
high levels of compliance but low levels of eff ectiveness. 22 
 As abstract propositions, both views are equally plausible—and equally non- 
falsifi able. Future studies should expose the assumptions underlying the two approaches 
and test them empirically. Th e claim that IC judgments mirror the outcomes that states 
would have obtained through negotiation or politics may be a reasonable assumption 
in some issue areas or contexts, but not in others. 23 An example of the fi rst cat-
egory are cases in which two nations submit a dispute over a territorial or maritime 
boundary to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on an ad hoc basis. Th e tribunals’ jurisprudence in 
such cases tends toward compromise and acknowledges the merits of both parties’ 
claims. 24 An illustration of the second category are human rights complaints fi led 
by private litigants. Such suits oft en target domestic laws and practices that refl ect 
deeply held national values. IC judgments challenging those values are sometimes 
met with skepticism or overt resistance. 25 
 More careful attention to counterfactuals will also narrow the gap between the 
two approaches and assist in making plausible causal inferences about case-specifi c 
eff ectiveness. Recall Hawkins and Jacoby’s assertion, quoted above, that when a 
state changes its behavior following a judgment against that state, it is reasonable 
to assume that the judgment materially infl uenced the behavioral change “even if 
other factors may also have been important.” 26 Identifying the causal contribution 
of those “other factors” is critical to evaluating the case-specifi c eff ectiveness of ICs. 
 Consider the March 2011 provisional measures issued by the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) during the civil war in Libya. Th e court 
ordered the state, then headed by Muammar Gaddafi , to “immediately refrain from 
any action that would result in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons.” 27 
 21  Hawkins and Jacoby, note 18, at 83–5.    22  Guzman, note 5, at 187. 
 23  LR Helfer and A-M Slaughter, “Why States Create International Tribunals:  A  Response 
to Professors Posner and Yoo” (2005) 93 Calif. L.  Rev. 899, 941 (explaining that, in bilateral inter-
state disputes, ICs “may operate as an extension of nonlegal, diplomatic methods of . . . compliance 
inducement”). 
 24  See e.g., S Ratner, “Land Feuds and their Solutions:  Finding International Law Beyond the 
Tribunal Chamber” (2006) 100 AJIL 808, 815–16. 
 25  See e.g., LR Helfer, “Th e Benefi ts and Burdens of Brighton” (2012) ESIL Refl ections, Vol. 1, Issue 
1 < http://esil-sedi.eu/node/138 > accessed December 30, 2012 (describing backlash to ECtHR judg-
ments by government offi  cials and voters in the United Kingdom); LR Helfer, “Overlegalizing Human 
Rights: International Relations Th eory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human 
Rights Regimes” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1832 (analyzing strident opposition of Caribbean govern-
ments to human rights litigation aimed at curtailing or abolishing capital punishment). 
 26  Hawkins and Jacoby, note 18, at 40. 
 27  African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, “Order for Provisional Measures” (March 30, 2011), at 
para. 25.1, < http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/judgments/orders > accessed December 30, 2012. 
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Th e violence markedly diminished a few weeks later, but only aft er the UN Security 
Council authorized NATO to use military force to protect civilians. An acontextual 
analysis of state behavior in this instance might erroneously attribute compliance to 
the court’s ruling, rather than to the humanitarian intervention by NATO. 
 Other, less obvious examples cast doubt on the presumption that compliance 
in the wake of an adverse ruling is indicative of eff ectiveness. Newly elected demo-
cratic governments sometimes implement IC judgments against their predecessors 
as a signal to foreign and domestic audiences of their commitment to abjuring the 
repressive policies of the past. 28 In established democracies, IC litigation may be only 
one component of a multifaceted civil society campaign that includes domestic mobil-
ization, national court challenges, and transnational naming and shaming  strategies. 29 
In these and similar situations, it is plausible to attribute compliance, at least in part, 
to broader political or geostrategic factors rather than to an IC ruling. 
 A fi nal consideration relates to time horizons. 30 All other things being equal, a 
court whose decisions are implemented quickly is more eff ective than one whose 
judgments are complied with aft er delays. Th is assumption is appropriate as a 
preliminary baseline, but it must be adjusted to account for a range of other factors. It 
would be reasonable, for example, to expect compliance with broad or costly rem-
edies to require more time than compliance with more modest judicial orders. 31 
Th e compliance delays associated with a “high-aiming court,” to paraphrase Yuval 
Shany, should be discounted when evaluating that court’s case-specifi c eff ective-
ness. Conversely, even immediate adherence should be given little or no weight in 
assessing case-specifi c eff ectiveness if, as in the Libya example above, circumstances 
indicate that the court’s decision had little to do with the change in state behavior. 
 3  Erga Omnes Effectiveness  
 Th e numerous studies of case-specifi c eff ectiveness refl ect a basic feature of inter-
national adjudication:  IC judgments are legally binding only  inter partes and do 
not bind other states or the court in future cases. 32 Nevertheless, many IC rulings 
 28  See e.g., D Cassel, “Does International Human Rights Law Make a Diff erence?” (2001) 2 Chi. 
J. Int’l L. 121, 128–34 (describing Peru’s implementation of IACtHR judgments following the ousting of 
President Alberto Fujimori). 
 29  See e.g., SL Cummings, “Th e Internationalization of Public Interest Law” (2008) 57 Duke L.J. 891, 
994–5 (discussing the coordinated campaign to abolish the juvenile death penalty in the United States, 
which included international litigation as one of several complementary strategies). 
 30  Shany, note 2, at 134.    31  Huneeus, note 19, at 509–10. 
 32  See e.g., ICJ Statute [1945] Art. 59 (“Th e decision of the Court has no binding force except between 
the parties and in respect of that particular case”). 
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have—or at least purport to have— erga omnes eff ects that extend to all treaty par-
ties. 33 Th is section fi rst compares the  inter partes rule to the  erga omnes eff ect. It then 
reviews the literature that examines whether IC decisions are eff ective in infl uenc-
ing the behavior of actors beyond the litigants to a particular dispute. 
 Th e limited binding eff ect of IC rulings is an artifact of sovereignty. By recogniz-
ing an IC’s compulsory jurisdiction, a state undertakes a legal obligation to comply 
with judgments against it. Th e state does not, however, consent to be bound by 
rulings in which it did not participate, nor does it waive the right to argue that 
a new case should be distinguished from similar suits involving other nations. 34 
Th is limitation on international judicial authority sometimes results in repetitive 
litigation in which the only material diff erence is the identity of the countries 
involved in the proceedings. Th e trilogy of ICJ cases against the United States 
for violating the consular rights of foreign criminal defendants is one prominent 
example. 35 
 If the  inter partes rule were rigidly followed, international adjudication would be 
highly ineffi  cient. In practice, however, ICs view their prior decisions as persuasive, 
especially when they have coalesced into a  jurisprudence constant . Th e weight given 
to precedent means that “absent cogent reasons, an adjudicative body will resolve the 
same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.” 36 Some ICs have been bolder, 
characterizing their decisions as authoritative for all actors in a legal system. For 
 example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has asserted that it 
“determin[es] issues on public-policy grounds in the common interest, thereby . . . 
extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the community of Convention 
States,” 37 and the World Trade Organization Appellate Body stated that “the legal 
interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports becomes 
part and parcel of the  acquis of the WTO dispute settlement system.” 38 
 An IC’s assertion that its decisions have an  erga omnes eff ect may, however, 
engender resistance by some countries. Th e United States, for example, has argued 
that the “concept of  erga omnes is squarely at odds with the fundamentally bilateral 
nature of WTO and GATT dispute settlement.” 39 Further, many European countries 
 33  Th e Latin phrase  erga omnes means “fl owing to all.” 
 34  Th ese statements have even greater force for ICs whose jurisdiction states recognize on an ad 
hoc basis. 
 35  See e.g., R Graebne, “Dialogue and Divergence: Th e Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 
German, American, and International Courts” (2011) 42 Geo. J. Int’l L. 605, 607–11. 
 36  United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico [2008] WT/DS344/
AB/R [160] (Anti-Dumping Measures). 
 37  Karner v. Austria [2003] App. No. 40016/98, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. [26]. 
 38  Anti-Dumping Measures, note 36, at para. 160. 
 39  US Statement at the DSB Meeting of May 7, 2003, Item 2, US—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales 
Corporations, WT/DSB/M/149 (July 8, 2003), para. 20. 
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do not consider the  erga omnes eff ect of ECtHR rulings to be a legal requirement. 40 Yet 
there are also counter-examples. Canada abandoned its “zeroing” policy on dumping 
with explicit reference to prior WTO rulings against the EU and United States. 41 High 
courts in Argentina and Colombia struck down amnesty laws based on judgments 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) invalidating amnesties in 
Peru. 42 And a 2010 Council of Europe report identifi es countries whose parliaments 
have revised statutes following ECtHR judgments condemning similar laws adopted 
by other states. 43 
 Th e politically contested and empirically unsettled nature of the  erga omnes eff ect 
is refl ected in the wide range of studies that consider whether ICs are eff ective in 
infl uencing the behavior of all actors subject to their authority. 44 One strand of 
scholarship has an overtly normative bent. Works in this vein seek to clarify the 
divergent meanings of  erga omnes in judicial decisions and legal discourse, assess 
the desirability of strong or weak versions of the eff ect and suggest proposals to 
enhance the systemic impact of IC rulings. Two recent noteworthy examples are 
Samantha Besson’s study of the ECtHR and Karin Oellers-Frahm’s analysis of ICJ 
advisory opinions. 45 
 A related literature considers whether states should redesign ICs to bolster the 
 erga omnes eff ect. Attention has focused primarily on the ECtHR, due to its massive 
backlog of pending applications. Th e court’s docket crisis has generated political 
declarations, such as the 2010 Interlaken Action Plan, which urges governments 
to consider “the conclusions to be drawn from a judgment fi nding a violation of 
the [European] Convention by another State, where the same problem of principle 
exists within their own legal system.” 46 Th e crisis has also engendered arguments 
from scholars and judges that the ECtHR should focus on novel legal issues and 
articulate general principles applicable to all states parties. 47 Studies advocating 
 40  S Besson, “Th e Erga Omnes Eff ect of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights—What’s 
in a Name?” in S Besson (ed.)  Th e European Court of Human Rights Aft er Protocol 14 (Geneva: Schulthess 
2011) at 125, 141. 
 41  J Kanargelidis, “New Anti-Dumping Rules Applied by Canada: Th e Zeroing Debate” (September 
7, 2005) Mondaq Business Briefi ng. 
 42  C Binder, “Th e Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights” (2011) 
12 German L.J. 1203, 1222–3. 
 43  Committee on Legal Aff airs and Human Rights, “Strengthening Subsidiarity—Integrating the 
Court’s Case-Law into National Law and Judicial Practice” (Oct. 1–2, 2010), < http://assembly.coe.int/
CommitteeDocs/2010/20101125_skopje.pdf > accessed December 31, 2012. 
 44  Th e issue is closely linked to whether ICs are eff ective in promoting what Shany refers to as “pri-
mary norm compliance” by states. Shany, note 2, at 245. 
 45  Besson, note 40; K Oellers-Frahm, “Lawmaking Th rough Advisory Opinions?” (2011) 12 German 
L.J. 1033. 
 46  “High Level Conference on the Future of the ECtHR,” Interlaken Declaration, February 19, 2010, 
Action Plan, sec. 4.c. 
 47  See e.g., S Greer,  Th e European Convention on Human Rights:  Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects ( Cambridge University Press 2006); L Wildhaber, “A Constitutional Future for the European 
Court of Human Rights” (2002) 23 Hum. Rts. L.J. 161. 
21_9780199660681_c21.indd   472 29-11-2013   01:46:11
Erga Omnes Effectiveness   473
a more permissive approach to third-party interventions and  amicus briefs oft en 
refl ect similar concerns. 48 Th e more that IC decisions depart from the  inter partes 
rule, the greater the need for all potentially aff ected actors to have a meaningful 
opportunity to infl uence those decisions. 
 A third cluster of research uses quantitative empirical methods to analyze the 
behavior of governments, both as policymakers and as prospective litigants. A recent 
paper by Helfer and Erik Voeten considers the fi rst issue. It fi nds that ECtHR judg-
ments on LGBT rights increase the likelihood that other countries in Europe—in 
particular states in which public acceptance of homosexuality is low—will adopt 
pro-LGBT policies. To measure the  erga omnes eff ect, the authors code national 
LGBT policies by country and year adopted, control for confounding variables 
that could explain policy reforms and isolate the extent to which ECtHR judges 
respond to preexisting legal and social trends. 49 Quantitative analyses of dispute 
settlement patterns in the WTO analyze the behavior of states as litigants. 50 Th ese 
studies, including articles by Guzman and Beth Simmons, as well as by Marc Busch 
and Eric Reinhardt, do not address the  erga omnes eff ect directly. Th ey do, however, 
implicitly assume that prior panel and Appellate Body decisions cast a shadow that 
infl uences whether other nations litigate or settle a dispute over alleged violations 
of free trade rules. 
 Future research on  erga omnes eff ectiveness should focus on identifying the specifi c 
conditions under which IC decisions are more or less likely to infl uence the behavior 
of non-parties. For example, qualitative process tracing and case studies can document 
variations in behavior among diff erent branches of government in countries subject 
to an IC’s jurisdiction. Quantitative studies can compare the strength of the  erga omnes 
eff ect across tribunals and issue areas. Both types of studies face similar challenges: 
determining whether behavioral changes are attributable to IC rulings as opposed to 
other factors, and identifying the specifi c mechanisms of IC infl uence. As discussed 
in the previous section, developing credible counterfactuals and considering plausible 
alternative explanations for rule-consistent conduct will be critical to overcoming these 
challenges. 
 48  See e.g., A von Bogdandy, “In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public 
Authority and its Democratic Justifi cation” (2012) 23 EJIL 7, 27–30. 
 49  LR Helfer and E Voeten, “International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT 
Rights in Europe” (forthcoming 2014) 67 Int’l Org. 
 50  See e.g., A Guzman and B Simmons, “To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation 
and Settlement at the WTO” (2002) 31 J. Leg. Stud. 205; M Busch and E Reinhardt, “Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes” (2000) 24 Fordham Int’l L. J. 158. See 
also M Gilligan et al., “Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes” (2010) 
54 J. Confl ict Res. 5. 
21_9780199660681_c21.indd   473 29-11-2013   01:46:11
474   The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators
 4  Embeddedness Effectiveness  
 A third dimension of eff ectiveness considers whether ICs enhance the ability of 
domestic actors to prevent or remedy violations of international rules “at home,” 
thus avoiding the need for international litigation. Th is section reviews studies that 
evaluate whether ICs are eff ective in embedding international law and international 
judicial rulings in national legal orders. 
 Embeddedness eff ectiveness received little attention when the primary task of 
ICs was to settle interstate disputes. Th e issue became far more salient when ICs 
were given authority to review challenges to domestic laws and policies in response 
to complaints fi led by private actors. Yet ICs have neither the competence nor the 
resources to review all such challenges. Th is raises the critical question of whether 
national judges, legislators, and administrators can be incentivized to serve as 
the fi rst-line defenders of international law, adopting measures that promote rule 
compliance and provide remedies for any violations that do occur. 
 Studies of whether ICs are eff ective in inducing domestic actors to carry out 
these functions focus on institutional design features, most notably jurisdiction and 
access rules. For example, tribunals that require complainants to exhaust domes-
tic remedies must inevitably assess whether national judicial and administrative 
procedures off er viable opportunities for litigants to obtain redress for colorable 
violations of international law. Scholarship on regional human rights courts—such 
as Helfer’s study of the ECtHR, 51 and analyses of the IACtHR by James Cavallaro 
and Stephanie Brewer, and by Huneeus 52 —identify how these courts construct their 
interpretative methods and remedial orders to incentivize compliance by national 
decision-makers. Prominent among these strategies is giving greater deference to 
decision-makers who treat IC decisions as persuasive when reviewing complaints 
alleging violations of individual rights. 
 Diff erent embeddedness issues emerge when international judges can forge direct 
links to their national counterparts. Scholars have widely attributed the success of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in promoting regional integration to the court’s 
preliminary reference procedure, which enables domestic judges to seek guidance 
on the meaning of European Union law. 53 Spurred by requests from private litigants 
who benefi ted from favorable European rules, national courts became the ECJ’s 
 51  LR Helfer, “Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:  Embeddedness as a Deep 
Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime” (2008) 19 EJIL 125, 144–6, 152–5. 
 52  J Cavallaro and SE Brewer, “Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First 
Century:  Th e Case of the Inter-American Court” (2008) 102 AJIL 768, 816–22; Huneeus, note 19, 
at 526–9. 
 53  See e.g., GF Mancini, “Th e Making of a Constitution for Europe” (1989) 26 Common Mkt. 
L. Rev. 595. 
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primary interlocutors and compliance partners. Over time, judges referred a growing 
number of cases and became habituated to following the ECJ’s rulings. 54 When EC 
rules and the supranational cases interpreting them had been fi rmly entrenched 
in national judicial mindsets, the ECJ announced the doctrine of  acte clair , which 
directed national judges to refrain from referring cases that raised settled legal 
issues, including cases in which courts were expected to—and did—invalidate the 
off ending domestic law or policy. 55 
 Preliminary reference mechanisms also enable ICs to forge alliances with domes-
tic actors other than courts. Alter and Helfer’s work on the Andean legal system 
demonstrates that more than 90 percent of Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) rulings 
emanate from administrative agencies that apply Andean intellectual property rules 
when reviewing applications to register trademarks and patents. A litigant dissatis-
fi ed with an agency’s decision can appeal to national courts, which refer questions 
of Andean law to the ATJ and then apply the tribunal’s legal interpretation to resolve 
the case. In practice, however, national judges have been mostly passive intermedi-
aries in a mutually constitutive relationship between Andean judges and domestic 
administrators. Th e agencies encouraged references and participated in litigation 
before the tribunal, and the ATJ issued decisions that responded to the agencies’ 
concerns. ATJ rulings improved the agencies’ decision-making procedures, clarifi ed 
ambiguities in Andean rules, helped to insulate offi  cials from political pressure and 
bolstered administrators’ fi delity to the rule of law. Th e agencies, in turn, acted as 
compliance constituencies for Andean judges, scrupulously following Andean law 
as interpreted by the ATJ even in the face of confl icting national decrees. 56 
 Other studies have analyzed embeddedness issues in international criminal law. Th e 
founders of the International Criminal Court (ICC) recognized that domestic trials of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity would sometimes be preferable to 
international prosecutions. Th ey thus directed the ICC to declare inadmissible, inter 
alia, cases being investigated or prosecuted domestically, “unless the State is unwilling 
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” 57 Th is complemen-
tarity principle requires the ICC to make fi ne-grained evaluations of the intent and 
capacity of government offi  cials 58 —assessments that are facilitated by domestic trust 
 54  K Alter,  Th e European Court’s Political Power:  Selected Essays (Oxford University Press 
2009) chs 4, 5. 
 55  See e.g., H Rasmussen, “Th e European Court’s Acte Clair Strategy in C.I.L.F.I.T. or Acte Clair, of 
Course! But what does it Mean?” (1984) 9 Eur. L. Rev. 242. 
 56  LR Helfer and K Alter, “Th e Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors: Understanding the 
Preliminary Ruling Reference Patterns in the Andean Community” (2009) 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l & Pol. 871, 912–
20; LR Helfer, K Alter, and MF Guerzovich, “Islands of Eff ective International Adjudication: Constructing 
an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community” (2009) 103 AJIL 1, 21–6. 
 57  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, Art. 17.1. 
 58  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, note 57, Arts 17.2 and 17.3. See also L Yang, 
“On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” 
(2005) 4 Chinese J. Int’l L. 121. 
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in international proceedings. Unfortunately, the ICC’s emphasis on atrocities in 
Africa has stirred controversy and precipitated a public rebuke by African leaders. 
Behind the scenes, however, scholars have highlighted how the ICC’s Offi  ce of the 
Prosecutor is building relationships with national decision-makers and encouraging 
them to develop trial and accountability mechanisms that satisfy the complementary 
standard. 59 Th ese eff orts will determine the extent to which the ICC is eff ective in 
anchoring its vision of international criminal justice in national legal orders. 
 Future research on embeddedness eff ectiveness should address several under-
studied issues. First, a few ICs with human rights jurisdiction, including the Court of 
Justice of the ECOWAS Court of Justice (ECOWAS CJ) and the East African Court 
of Justice (EACJ), do not require exhaustion of local remedies. African NGOs have 
praised the omission of exhaustion as enabling litigants to bypass overburdened 
and unresponsive domestic courts and fi le complaints directly with these ICs. But 
direct international review of complaints can create frictions with national judges, 
making it harder to forge the judicial partnerships on which eff ective embedded-
ness oft en depends. 60 A  second issue concerns ICs that must occasionally act as 
fi rst-instance courts. Th e ECtHR, for example, has assumed this function when 
reviewing “hot spots” of civil unrest in Turkey and Chechnya. 61 A key challenge, 
however, is how a tribunal steps back from this front-line position when domes-
tic conditions improve. A third underexplored topic concerns courts that exercise 
jurisdiction over countries in which governments are unstable, the rule of law is 
weak, or judges are only partially independent. An IC’s ability to embed its rulings 
in such countries may require cultivating the support of sub-state institutions that 
“forge a relationship with a supranational tribunal as an ally in a domestic political 
battle against corruption or oppression.” 62 
 5  Effectiveness in Developing 
International Law  
 Th e previous three types of eff ectiveness evaluate the extent to which IC rulings 
alter the behavior of litigants, states, and government actors. A fourth dimension of 
eff ectiveness analyzes the norm-generating functions of ICs. Th e literature on this 
 59  See e.g., W Burke-White, “Proactive Complementarity: Th e International Criminal Court and 
National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice” (2008) 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 53. 
 60  AO Enabulele, “Sailing against the Tide: Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies and the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice” (2012) 56 J. Afr. L. 268. 
 61  Helfer, note 51, at 142–4.    62  Helfer and Slaughter, note 10, at 335. 
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topic is vast and includes studies of treaty interpretation, 63 judicial lawmaking, 64 
judicial activism, 65 transjudicial communication, 66 and the fragmentation of inter-
national law. 67 Th is section reviews a subset of this literature—studies of how the 
disaggregated nature of the international legal system and the quality of a tribunal’s 
reasoning infl uence whether ICs are eff ective in developing international law. 
 Most ICs are specialized bodies that interpret and apply only the treaty that 
establishes them, or a family of closely related treaties within a single legal regime. 68 
Th e ECtHR, for example, can review complaints alleging violations of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols—not other human rights agreements. 
An IC’s norm-development eff ectiveness is thus most oft en assessed by reference to 
how its judges interpret and apply the particular treaty or area of international law that 
falls within its purview. 
 Within these specialized domains, courts oft en develop a reputation for particular 
doctrinal innovations. Th e IACtHR, for example, is a pioneer in fashioning creative 
and far-reaching remedies for human rights abuses. 69 Th e ECtHR is famous for using 
the margin of appreciation doctrine to temper global human rights standards to local 
particularities. 70 Th e WTO jurists are well known for consulting dictionaries to deduce 
the ordinary meaning of trade treaties. 71 Th e ATJ has made its mark by balancing intel-
lectual property rights against consumer protection and public health goals. 72 Even the 
ICJ—a court of general jurisdiction—has developed a niche market in territorial and 
maritime boundary disputes. 73 
 63  See e.g. I Venzke, “Th e Role of International Courts as Interpreters and Developers of the Law: 
Working Out the Jurisgenerative Practice of Interpretation” (2011) 34 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 99. 
 64  See e.g., T Ginsburg, “Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking” (2005) 43 Va. 
J. Int’l L. 631; R Steinberg, “Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political 
Constraints” (2004) 98 AJIL 247. 
 65  See e.g., F Zarbiyev, “Judicial Activism in International Law—A Conceptual Framework for 
Analysis” (2012) 3 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 247. 
 66  See e.g., A-M Slaughter, “A Typology of Transjudicial Communication” (1994) 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 
99; M Waters, “Mediating Norms and Identity: Th e Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating 
and Enforcing International Law” (2005) 93 Geo. L.J. 487. 
 67  See e.g., OK Fauchald and A Nollkaemper (eds),  Th e Practice of International and National Courts 
and the (De)Fragmentation of International Law (Oxford: Hart 2012). 
 68  Th e ICJ is an obvious exception, although the court’s ability to interpret international law in gen-
eral is constrained by the limited number of nations that have accepted its compulsory jurisdiction, the 
broad reservations that oft en accompany such acceptances, and the paucity of disputes referred to the 
court on an ad hoc basis. 
 69  See e.g., T Antkowiak, “Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: Th e Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and Beyond” (2008) 46 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 351. 
 70  See e.g., Y Arai-Takahashi,  Th e Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality 
in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerp: Intersentia 2002). 
 71  C Lo, “Good Faith Use of Dictionary in the Search of Ordinary Meaning under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding” (2010) 1 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 431. 
 72  Helfer, Alter and Guerzovich, note 56, at 21–36. 
 73  See e.g., A Alvarez-Jimenez, “Boundary Agreements in the International Court of Justice’s Case 
Law, 2000–2010” (2012) 23 EJIL 495. 
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 Th e more closely that an IC is associated with regime-specifi c innovations, the 
greater the likelihood that observers will evaluate its norm-development eff ectiveness 
by reference to its performance in that specialized area, such as whether its deci-
sions clarify ambiguities, fi ll lacunae, and promote the underlying objectives of the 
legal obligations that the court supervises. 
 As the number of IC rulings has increased, however, scholars have begun to focus 
on “the systematic fashion in which some [ICs] are developing a body of law of gen-
eral relevance.” 74 Th e Appellate Body’s statement that WTO agreements are “not to 
be read in clinical isolation from public international law” 75 is oft en cited as evidence 
of this trend. Th e extent to which ICs are eff ective in elucidating broader legal prin-
ciples may depend on whether their decisions are emulated elsewhere. For example, 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR—the oldest and most active IC—has long inspired 
other human rights tribunals, a phenomenon documented in case studies of trans-
judicial dialogue and more systematic analysis of citations to IC precedents. 76 More 
recently, the decisions of newer human rights courts have infl uenced ECtHR judges 
searching for doctrinal responses to systemic human rights abuses that plague some 
corners of Europe. 77 
 A related issue concerns cases that straddle the border between legal domains. 
Such suits arise less frequently than cases within the heartland of an IC’s jurisdiction. 
But how judges resolve these “boundary disputes” oft en receives disproportionate 
attention in assessments of a court’s eff ectiveness in developing international law. 
Examples include the Appellate Body’s accommodation of multilateral eff orts to 
protect the environment and public health when adjudicating free trade disputes, 78 
and the IACtHR’s interpretation of human rights in light of international humani-
tarian law. 79 Th e heightened salience of these cases is a consequence of the uneven 
distribution of ICs across the international legal system. Because ICs do not exist 
in some areas of international law (such as the environment and arms control), 
 74  Von Bogdandy and Vetzke, note 4, at 980. See also Shaff er and Ginsburg, note 8, at 18 ( arguing 
that a “central question regarding international tribunals . . . is whether [and the conditions under 
which] they aff ect the production, consolidation, and application of international law”). 
 75  United States—Standard for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline [1996] WT/DS2/AB/R, 
sec. III.B. 
 76  See e.g., Y Lupu and E Voeten, “Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case 
Citations by the European Court of Human Rights” (2012) 42 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 413; A-M Slaughter, “A 
Global Community of Courts” (2003) 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 191. 
 77  G Neuman, “Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights” (2008) 19 EJIL 101, 116–18. 
 78  See e.g.,  Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products [1998] WT/DS58/AB/R. Scholars disagree over the extent to which WTO jurists can apply 
non-WTO law. Compare J Pauwelyn, “Th e Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can 
We Go?” (2001) 95 AJIL 535, with JP Trachtman, “Th e Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution” (1999) 40 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 333. 
 79  L Burgorgue-Larse et al.,  Th e Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case-Law and Commentary 
(Oxford University Press 2011) 69–71. 
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litigants oft en ask courts in other regimes (human rights and trade, for example) to 
apply legal rules beyond their primary areas of competence. 
 A more fi ne-grained dimension of norm-development eff ectiveness concerns the 
quality of an IC’s legal reasoning. Studies of supranational adjudication in Europe, 
for example, attribute the success of the ECJ and ECtHR to the courts’ adept use of 
“the language of reasoned interpretation, logical deduction, systemic and temporal 
coherence.” 80 Th ese attributes created a “compliance pull” 81 for judicial rulings that 
infl uenced all actors within the EC and the European Convention legal systems, in 
particular national judges. 82 
 Scholarly assessments of legal reasoning generally focus on several issues. Th e 
fi rst relates to the structure of IC opinions and the extent to which they faithfully 
recount the litigants’ arguments before the court provides its own analysis. Such an 
approach off ers tangible proof that the judges have at least understood the parties’ 
claims. Litigants who believe that their arguments have been heard are more likely 
to participate in a future case. 83 A second issue concerns adherence to precedent. 
ICs are not bound by their own prior judgments. Yet most recognize that treating 
previous rulings as authoritative furthers the “interests of legal certainty, foreseeability 
and equality before the law,” 84 and encourages doctrinal consistency over time. 85 
A third metric for evaluating legal reasoning emphasizes decisions that overturn or 
revise existing jurisprudence. International judges acknowledge that such rulings 
require a heavy burden of justifi cation. 86 Th e weighty reasons they cite oft en involve 
the application of evolutive methods of treaty interpretation to ensure that existing 
case law does not become outmoded. 87 
 80  JHH Weiler, “A Quiet Revolution: Th e European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors” (1994) 26 
Comp. Pol. Stud. 510, 521. See also Helfer and Slaughter, note 10, at 318–23 (identifying the “quality of 
legal reasoning” as an attribute of eff ective supranational adjudication). 
 81  TM Franck,  Th e Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990) 24. 
 82  See e.g., A-M Burley and W Mattli, “Europe Before the Court:  A  Political Th eory of Legal 
Integration” (1993) 47 Int’l Org. 41; H Keller and A Stone Sweet,  A Europe of Rights: Th e Impact of 
the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford University Press 2008); P Popelier, et al.,  Human Rights 
Protection in the European Legal Order: Th e Interaction Between the European and the National Courts 
(Antwerp: Intersentia 2011). 
 83  See e.g., H Lauterpacht,  Th e Development of International Law by the International Court 
(Cambridge University Press 1958)  39 (“governments as a rule reconcile themselves to the fact that 
their case has not been successful—provided the defeat is accompanied by the conviction that their 
argument was considered in all its relevant aspects”). 
 84  Chapman v. United Kingdom , App. No. 27238/95, 2001-I (ECHR, Grand Chamber, 2001), at para. 70. 
 85  See e.g., B Simma, “Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner” 
(2009) 20 EJIL 265. 
 86  See e.g., A Mowbray, “An Examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to 
Overruling its Previous Case Law” (2009) 9 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 179. 
 87  See e.g., J Arato, “Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation:  Techniques of Treaty 
Interpretation over Time and Th eir Diverse Consequences” (2010) 9 L. & Prac. Int’l Cts. & Trib. 443; K 
Dzehtsiarou, “European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights” (2011) 12 German L.J. 1730. 
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 Future scholarship on IC eff ectiveness in developing international law will likely 
proceed along a number of tracks. As the number of international judicial rulings con-
tinues to increase, legal scholars and practicing lawyers will continue to analyze the 
jurisprudence of individual ICs. Th ese court-specifi c studies provide indispensable 
guides to case law that is becoming too voluminous for non-specialists to digest with-
out assistance. Th e studies also expose the doctrinal innovations of lesser-known 
sub-regional or specialized ICs to a wider audience of practitioners, scholars, and 
civil society advocates, who can then assess whether a particular court is eff ective in 
developing the legal norms within its purview. 88 Th e growing scrutiny of IC juris-
prudence may generate feedback loops as judges review and potentially reassess the 
persuasiveness of their legal reasoning in light of these external evaluations. 
 Th e collective contributions of ICs to developing legal norms will be aided by the 
growing scholarly interest in the comparative dimensions of international adjudi-
cation. 89 Th e Oxford University Press book series on ICs includes several volumes 
that contrast the doctrines and practices of multiple tribunals. Specialized journals, 
such as the  Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals and the  Journal 
of International Dispute Settlement , have published many similar studies. Several 
universities have also established interdisciplinary centers devoted to ICs. 90 Th e 
output of these scholarly venues will provide a rich body of evidence to evaluate 
the ways in which ICs, both individually and collectively, are eff ective in developing 
international law. 
 6  Conclusion  
 Th is chapter has reviewed four dimensions of IC eff ectiveness. Th ese dimensions are 
conceptually distinct. For example, an IC judgment may be ignored by the respondent 
state but trigger policy reforms in other nations subject to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
 88  Solomon Ebobrah’s pioneering work on three sub-regional community courts in Africa is a 
noteworthy example. See e.g., S Ebobrah, “Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts in 
Africa: Prospects and Challenges” (2009) 17 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 79. 
 89  See e.g., C Brown.  A Common Law of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2007); 
J Martinez, “Towards an International Judicial System” (2003) 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429. 
 90  See e.g., “iCourts: Th e Danish National Research Foundation’s Centre of Excellence for International 
Courts” < http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/ > accessed December 31, 2012; “ERC Project on Eff ective International 
Adjudication” < http://www.eff ective-intl-adjudication.org/ > accessed December 31, 2012; UiO Faculty 
of Law, “MultiRights: Th e Legitimacy of Multi-Level Human Rights Judiciary” < http://www.jus.uio.no/ 
english/research/projects/multirights/ > accessed December 31, 2012; “PluriCourts: Th e Legitimate Roles 
of the Judiciary in the Global Order” < http://www.follesdal.net/ pluricourts/ > accessed December 31, 2012. 
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Such a ruling would have low case-specifi c eff ectiveness but high  erga omnes 
eff ectiveness. Th ere is, however, a degree of overlap between the four dimensions at 
the margins, such as where an IC persuades national judges to remedy international law 
violations “at home” (increasing embeddedness eff ectiveness) and also infl uences the 
jurisprudence of other ICs (enhancing norm-development eff ectiveness). Careful 
attention to the multiple functions that international judges perform will help 
determine whether a court is eff ective in one or more of the four categories. 
 Future research might also consider the relationships among diff erent types of 
eff ectiveness. ICs vary in their ability to infl uence state behavior, anchor their 
judgments in domestic law, and develop international norms. Scholars might inves-
tigate the causes of these variations and their consequences for issues such as the 
legitimacy of international institutions. A  related line of inquiry would consider 
when diff erent effi  cacy objectives are mutually reinforcing or in tension with each 
other. For example, an IC that is eff ectively embedded in national legal orders might 
generate fewer international complaints and, as a result, have fewer opportunities to 
articulate  erga omnes norms applicable to all states. Similarly, a court that encourages 
litigants to settle their disputes may receive high marks for case-specifi c eff ectiveness 
but be less eff ective in developing international law. 
 Research Questions 
 1.  Under what conditions can a change in a state’s behavior following an international court 
judgment against that state be attributed to the judgment as opposed to other factors? 
 2.  Under what circumstances do international court decisions infl uence the behavior of 
actors other than the parties to a particular dispute? 
 3.  What strategies do international judges use to incentivize compliance by national 
decision-makers, thereby avoiding the need for international litigation? 
 4.  How does the disaggregated nature of the international legal system aff ect whether 
international courts are eff ective in developing international legal norms? 
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